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1 Introduction
The study of centralized markets has been privileged in the two-sided matching literature. The
introduction of centralized matching procedures in markets that experienced certain kinds of
failures is partially responsible for such dedication. In fact, a number of markets for physi-
cians, lawyers, dentists, and osteopaths, among others have adopted central clearinghouses
after periods of uncontrolled unraveling of appointment dates and chaotic recontracting.1 These
markets now work by having each agent of the two sides of the market submit a rank ordered
preference list of acceptable matches to the central clearinghouse, which then produces a match-
ing by processing all the preference lists according to an algorithm. Roth (1984a, 1991) showed
that the algorithms used in most of the successful clearinghouses roughly follow the lines of
Gale and Shapleys deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962). This procedure
generates a matching of workers to positions that is stable in terms of the submitted preferences
in the sense that no worker and rm that are not matched to each other would prefer to be so
matched.2
In contrast, decentralized markets have received relatively little attention.3 The exact set of
rules that governs a centralized market, making it particularly amenable to analysis, is no longer
present when matching is organized in a decentralized way. Moreover, decentralized markets
involve di¤erent strategic issues from those of centralized markets. In fact, when a clearinghouse
exists, agents must simply decide what preference lists to submit to the matchmaker, after which
the match is created. However, in a decentralized market agents do not submit lists; instead,
1See Roth and Xing (1994) and Niederle and Roth (2003).
2See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive study of two-sided matching markets.
3There are notable exceptions, namely Blum, Roth, and Rothblum (1997), Haeringer and Wooders (2004),
Roth and Vande Vate (1991), Roth and Xing (1997), among others.
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they can decide, after each interview or telephone call what to do next. The size of the strategy
space is thus extremely large and has precluded analysis by means of standard matching tools.
The purpose of this paper is to apply the extremely simple marriage model to the study of
decentralized labor markets. In this model, agentspreferences are ordinal in nature. Hence, we
merely take for granted their ability to order the potential working partners, without assuming
that they are capable of giving cardinal content to their preferences.4 The starting point of
the analysis is any matching situation, providing a framework to the study of both entry-
level and senior level markets. The matching process is then modeled as an extensive form
game, where rms sequentially o¤er their positions. Clearly, decentralized decision making
in complex environments may introduce randomness in the order in which o¤ers are made.
The speed of the mail, the telephone network, or the internal structure of rms making some
react faster than others determine the success in establishing communication with the desired
workers. Such inherently uncertain features of the market are modeled here as chance moves
that determine the order of play. Hence, at each moment in time, any rm even if already
matched is randomly selected and given the opportunity to o¤er its position to a worker.
This worker compares it with any o¤er he may be holding and rejects one, while (temporarily)
holding the other, pending the possible arrival of even better o¤ers. Note that only rms have
the initiative to make proposals or to cease a working relationship, while workers undertake the
more passive role of reacting to o¤ers. We assume that, once rejected, the rm is not willing to
propose to the same worker again, but it may obviously o¤er its position to a di¤erent worker
4 It follows that monetary transfers are embodied in agentspreferences, i.e., there is more to a job than just
a salary.
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when given the opportunity to act.5
In a decentralized labor market, informal rules and practices govern the process of making
proposals, and also their comparison, acceptance, or rejection. There are thus di¤erent options
when it comes to modeling such elements of market culture which, together with the assump-
tions taken on what agents know when taking decisions, play an important role in inuencing
the results. Two closely related papers are worth mentioning. Haeringer and Wooders (2004)
model decentralized markets in which only rms make job o¤ers, agents decisions may be
irreversible once a proposal is accepted, the agents involved simply leave the market and
agents hold a lot of information on the history of the game.6 There is no uncertainty whatso-
ever, suggesting that markets are small worlds. In contrast, Blum, Roth, and Rothblum (1997)
model a senior level labor market where agents are poorly informed each rm knows which
of her o¤ers have been rejected and by whom, and each worker recalls all the proposals he
obtained and there is no commitment. Nevertheless, only rms with vacant positions are al-
lowed to make proposals: ring a worker is simply too costly. In this paper, no such restriction
is imposed, i.e., any rm, even if matched, can hire a new worker or simply re its current
match. There is no commitment: agents are greedy and always willing to look for a better
partner. Moreover, agents may hold di¤erent degrees of information on the actions of the oth-
ers, ranging from the imperfect information scenario in Blum, Roth, and Rothblum (1997) to
knowing every proposal made, accepted, and rejected. Finally, we extend the analysis to the
case in which every agent, rm or worker, may have the initiative to either break the current
5 It does not appear that allowing for any nite number of repeated proposals would materially change the
validity of the results that follow.
6Throughout the paper, information is assumed to be perfect or almost perfect: agents on each side of the
market may ignore some actions of their peers.
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match or start a new working relationship. Hence, this paper does not compete with the cited
literature, but rather complements it by providing yet another perspective on the functioning
of decentralized markets.
In our setting, the random order in which rms are selected introduces some uncertainty in
which matchings are achieved. In fact, it may happen that starting with the same initial match-
ing, di¤erent plays of the game yield di¤erent outcomes for the same strategy prole. Since
preferences are ordinal, in order to compare di¤erent probability distributions over matchings,
we use a solution concept based on rst-order stochastic dominance. The notion of ordinal Nash
equilibrium guarantees that each agent is an expected utility maximizer for every utility rep-
resentation of his preferences.7 We go beyond this concept to account for the dynamic nature
of the game and characterize subgame perfect ordinal Nash equilibria. Despite the strength of
this concept, we prove the existence of subgame perfect ordinal Nash equilibria and, in particu-
lar, equilibria where rms use preference strategies (i.e., strategies that can, up to some point,
be identied with a list of preferences). On the other hand, every such equilibrium delivers
matchings that are stable with respect to a particular prole of preferences. This has two
appealing implications. First, for any equilibrium where rms adhere to preference lists, all
outcomes are such that the set of unmatched agents is the same. Second, in the particular case
that rms act according to their true preferences, stability with respect to the true preferences
is guaranteed in a subgame perfect ordinal Nash equilibrium. This provides an explanation for
the success of some decentralized labor markets. In fact, if we expect equilibria where rms
act straightforwardly to prevail, only stable matchings are obtained and no individual agent
7This concept was introduced in dAspremont and Peleg (1988); it has been used in the context of voting
theory in Majumdar and Sen (2004) and in matching markets in Ehlers and Massó (2003), Majumdar (2003),
and Pais (2004).
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or pair of agents (consisting of a rm and a worker) will have the incentive to circumvent the
matching. Moreover, using a list of preferences as a strategy or revealing the true preferences
can be justied in some settings. The decisions of a rm do not usually reect the opinion of a
single individual; instead, such actions embody a complex process of assembling the opinions
of several individuals. We may conjecture that establishing a list of candidates and using it as
guidance is despite the apparent myopia a more plausible form of behavior than deciding,
at each moment in time, whom to propose to. In addition, in some settings rms obey objec-
tive criteria to admit workers, so that strategic behavior on the rmsside looses its meaning.
The (partially) converse statement holds when we start from a situation where all agents are
unmatched: every stable matching for the true preferences can be reached as the outcome of
an equilibrium play where rms act straightforwardly according to their true preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the matching model, and review
some results on matching markets. We formally present the model in Section 3. In Section
4 we turn our attention to questions related to individual decision making and characterize
equilibria. Some results and underlying assumptions are discussed in Section 5. We conclude
in Section 6. Some proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Marriage Model
Consider two nite and disjoint sets F = ff1; :::; fng and W = fw1; :::; wpg, where F is the set
of rms and W is the set of workers. We let V = W [ F and sometimes refer to a generic
agent by v, while w and f represent a generic worker and rm, respectively. Each agent has
a strict, complete, and transitive preference relation over the agents on the other side of the
market and the perspective of being unmatched. The preferences of a rm f , for example, can
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be represented by Pf = w3; w1; f; w2; :::; w4, indicating that fs rst choice is to be matched
to w3, its second choice is w1 and it prefers remaining unmatched to being assigned to any
other worker. Sometimes it is su¢ cient to describe only fs ranking of workers it prefers to
remaining unmatched, so that the above preferences can be abbreviated as Pf = w3; w1. Let
P = (Pf1 ; :::; Pfn ; Pw1 ; :::; Pwp) denote the prole of all agentspreferences; we sometimes write
it as P = (Pv; P v) where P v is the set of preferences of all agents other than v. Further,
we may use PU , where U  V , to denote the prole of preferences (Pv)v2U . We write v0Pvv00
when v0 is preferred to v00 under preferences Pv and we say that v prefers v0 to v00. We write
v0Rvv00, when v likes v0 at least as well as v00 (it may be the case that v0 and v00 are the same
agent). A worker is acceptable if the rm prefers to employ him rather than having its position
unlled; similarly, a rm is acceptable to a worker if he prefers occupying its position, rather
than being unemployed.
Formally, a marriage market is a triple (F;W;P ). An outcome for a marriage market, a
matching, is a function  : V  ! V satisfying the following: (i) for each f in F and for each w
in W , (f) = w if and only if (w) = f ; (ii) if (f) 6= f then (f) 2W ; (iii) if (w) 6= w then
(w) 2 F . If (v) = v, then v is unmatched under , while if (w) = f , we say that f and w
are matched to one another. A description of a matching is given by  = f(f1; w2); (f2; w3)g,
indicating that f1 is matched to w2, f2 is matched to w3 and the remaining agents in the
market are unmatched. A matching  is individually rational if each agent is acceptable to its
partner, i.e., (v)Rvv, for all v 2 V . We denote the set of all individually rational matchings
by IR(P ). Two agents f and w form a blocking pair for  if they prefer each other to the
agents they are actually assigned to under , i.e., fPw(w) and wPf(f). A matching  is
stable if it is individually rational and it is not blocked by any pair of agents. We denote the
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set of all stable matchings by S(P ).
3 The Decentralized Job Matching Game
3.1 Description of the Game
In this section, we dene the Decentralized Game. The game is given by a market (F;W;P )
and an initial matching I . In general, we consider I to be individually rational under the
true preferences. The rules of the game are as follows.
The game begins with a node at which nature chooses a sequence of rms at random. Each
sequence corresponds to an order at which rms are given the opportunity to make proposals.
Following natures move, the rst rm in the selected sequence has the chance to make a
proposal. If unmatched under I , the rm may propose to any worker or pass its turn. If
matched under I , it may simply re its initial partner, propose to a di¤erent worker, or pass
its turn and keep the initial partner.
In the case that a proposal is actually made, the game continues by having the proposed
worker deciding whether to accept or to reject the o¤er. If he accepts, a new matching is
formed where this worker and the proposing rm are together and their previous partners, if
any, are unmatched. If he rejects, I goes on unchanged. In the case that the rm simply
chose to re its initial worker, a new matching is formed where the rm and its former partner
are unmatched, whereas if the rm chose pass,the initial matching is preserved.
The second rm then moves and the game continues by giving rms the opportunity to
make o¤ers, in accordance with the order of the sequence. Each time a rm is called to play,
the available moves depend on whether its position is vacant or not. If vacant, the rm may
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propose to any worker to whom it has not proposed before or simply pass its turn. Otherwise,
it may re the worker it holds, propose to a worker di¤erent from its current match and from
any worker it has already proposed to, or pass its turn. When a worker receives a proposal, he
may accept the o¤er or reject it and keep his former partner.
The game continues as long as there is at least one rm wishing to make a new o¤er or to
re the incumbent worker. As soon as every rm in the market sequentially passes its turn,
the game ends.
Two remarks are in order. First, the fact that rms are reluctant to repeating o¤ers guaran-
tees that every play of the game ends in a nite number of steps. Still, relaxing this simplifying
assumption and allowing for a nite number of repeated o¤ers would not compromise the re-
sults. Second, a matched worker is only allowed to reject his current position if he obtains and
accepts an alternative o¤er. This is a one-side-proposing game: workers do not have the spirit
to make o¤ers or even to quit their current job. In Section 5, we discuss the consequences of
having both rms and workers playing an active role.
To complete the description of the game, we still have to specify the information that
each agent possesses throughout the game. It is sensible to assume that in labor markets
where myriads of rms and workers interact, each agent only becomes aware of events as they
directly impinge on him. In the particular case of a rm, this means that it learns only if
the proposal it made was accepted or rejected, or if its position became vacant. Hence, a
rms information set is dened by its initial partner and an ordered list of workers to whom it
proposed, along with their reactions. Similarly, a worker is only aware of events that directly
a¤ect him. A workers information set is identied by his initial position, as well as an ordered




Let us now focus on natures move. At each moment in time, a randomly selected rm is
given the chance to play. This random selection should not be interpreted merely as every
rm having equal probability of proposing at each step. It may reect some institutional
and perhaps inherently uncertain features of the market which are not modeled. In fact, in
decentralized markets matching is performed over the telephone network, using the mail, or
through the Internet. In such environments, randomness determines the order in which agents
communicate: it may depend on which telephone call goes through, on the speed of the mail,
or on how fast rms react to eventual proposals. Or it may even be the case that there exists
a natural order in which rms are expected to propose rms that have potentially more to
gain will certainly devote more resources into nding the right worker for their position and
are, therefore, more likely to make o¤ers.
To be precise, the game starts with a lottery prescribing a sequence of rms that denes
the subsequent moves. A sequence corresponds to one of the innumerable possible orders in
which rms are allowed to act. We assume that every sequence is innite and that, in each
sequence, every single rm appears innitely many times. We also assume that every sequence
has positive probability of occurring. The sample space over which this probability distribution
is dened is denoted by O and o is an arbitrary sample point, a sequence of rms.
8Such low information environment may be enriched. It may be the case that agents learn of the actions of
the others, even though they are not immediatly a¤ected by them. The validity of the results that follow will
be discussed for broader information structures.
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Note that, even though we consider innite sequences of rms, every play of the game ends
in nite time. In fact, as rms are only allowed to propose to each worker once and, obviously,
ring is possible only if matched, the moment comes when every rm chooses to pass its turn
if called to play, either because keeping the incumbent worker is part of its strategy, or because
passing is the only available action. Moreover, the fact that a rm appears innitely many
times in each sequence guarantees that this moment comes and the rm is actually called to
play. The end is then reached for every play of the game.
3.3 The Strategy Space
In what follows, we will describe agentsstrategies and introduce some notation. A players
strategy in the Decentralized Game complies with the usual denition of behavioral strategy
in an extensive form game, i.e., a plan of action for each information set where he is called
to act. However, in the context of a matching market there is a class of strategies worth
emphasizing, strategies that resemble those used in a centralized market. Following Blum,
Roth, and Rothblum (1997) we will call these strategies preference strategies.Such strategies
obey a consistency criterion in which agents decide how to move at any information set basing
on a list of preferences, including those information sets that would not be reached had that list
actually been used. Hence, deviations are regarded as temporary mistakes and further moves
t in the original list. To make things clear, when using a preference strategy, a rm selects an
ordered list of potential matches and, whenever called to propose, makes the o¤er to the best
worker on its list to whom it has not proposed before; likewise, a worker decides whether to
accept or to reject a new proposal by comparing it with his current position on his list.
Even though the lists of preferences that serve as guidance do not have to faithfully reveal
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agentstrue preferences, the set of preference strategies represents merely a small part of the set
of feasible strategies.9 For example, a worker ws strategy of accepting only the rst proposal he
gets and rejecting all the others is not consistent with any list of preferences. In fact, di¤erent
plays of the game induce di¤erent orders of proposals; thus, depending on the play of the game,
ws rst proposal may be from, say, f and f 0. It follows that f may be revealed preferred to
f 0 by w or vice-versa, which clearly cannot be consistent with a preference list.
As for notation, actions are taken at decision nodes, typically denoted by x. A strategy
prole  species a strategy for each agent; we sometimes write  = (v;  v), where v de-
notes the strategy of v and  v denotes the strategy prole of the other agents. Preference
strategies will be denoted by the corresponding preference prole Qv, for example, is a pref-
erence strategy for v while Pv always denotes vs true preferences. A sequence of rms o and
a strategy prole  determine a play of the game, denoted by .
3.4 Random Matching and Ordinal Nash Equilibria
In the Decentralized Game, di¤erent plays of the game with the same strategy prole may yield
di¤erent output matchings, depending on the order of proposals. This applies even in the case
that agents use preference strategies, as the following example illustrates.
Example 1 The outcome depends on the selection of the order by which rms propose.
9We refer to Pais (2004) for the analysis of a job matching game where the strategy space is conned to the
set of preference strategies.
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Let (F;W;P ) be a marriage market with P such that
Pw1 = f2; f1 Pf1 = w1; w2
Pw2 = f1; f3; f2
Pf2 = w2; w1
Pf3 = w2:
Note that the unique stable matching for this market is  = f(f1; w2); (f2; w1)g. Now
consider the Decentralized Game with I = f(f1; w2)g when agents play according to their
true preferences P .
Start by considering the case in which f3 is the rst to make an o¤er. Given that f3 is
using Pf3 , it proposes to the only acceptable worker, w2, and w2 rejects this proposal, as he is
initially matched to f1, the best rm on his list. Then, it may be the case that either f1s or
f2s opportunity comes. Let us say f1 makes an o¤er; it proposes to w1, the rst worker in Pf1 ,
who is currently unmatched and thus accepts the proposal. Once this proposal is accepted,
w2 is left unmatched. Hence, when f2 is given the chance to propose, w2 accepts its o¤er. In
the following moves every rm passes its turn, so that the game ends with the nal non-stable
matching ̂ = f(f1; w1); (f2; w2)g.
Nevertheless, if the rst randomly chosen rm is f2, its proposal to w2 is refused, as this
worker is still matched to f1 and f1 is preferred to f2 in Pw2 . The next rm to propose can
either be f1, f2, or f3. Assume f2 is the rst to propose. It proposes to w1, the second worker
on its list, and w1 accepts. Next, if f1s turn comes, it proposes to w1, who rejects this o¤er,
since he is matched to his top choice f2. So imagine f1 is called to propose once more, tendering
an o¤er to w2, who accepts it. When nally f3 proposes to w2, he rejects the o¤er, given that
he is already holding the highest ranked rm in his preference list. This play of the game
terminates when the three rms are given the chance to pass their turns and the matching
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 = f(f1; w2); (f2; w1)g is reached as the outcome of the game. 
Given an initial matching and a strategy prole, all the uncertainty on the order of play
as described above is fully translated into a probability distribution over the set of matchings.
Hence, x a probability distribution on O and take an initial matching I , a preference prole
P , and an arbitrary worker w (what follows also holds for a representative rm, with obvi-
ous modications). We will let gDGI [] denote the probability distribution over the set of
matchings induced by the Decentralized Game starting from I when the strategy prole  is
used and gDGI [](w) is the distribution that gDGI [] induces over F [ fwg. The expression
PrfgDGI [] = g represents the probability that  is the nal matching of the Decentralized
Game with the strategy prole . Moreover, PrfgDGI [](w)Rwvg is the probability that, in
the Decentralized Game, w obtains a partner at least as good as v when  is adopted. Observe
that these probabilities rest on the probability distribution on O, but all the results that follow
hold regardless of this lottery.
To address strategic questions we need to develop ideas about what constitutes a best
decision to be taken by an agent. With this purpose in mind, let  be a strategy prole
and again consider w 2 W . We say that, given  w, the strategy w stochastically Pw-
dominates 0w in the Decentralized Game if, for all v 2 F [fwg, PrfgDGI [w;  w](w)Rwvg 
PrfgDGI [0w;  w](w)Rwvg. Thus, for any level of satisfaction, the probability that ws match
exceeds that level of satisfaction is greater under gDGI [w;  w] than under gDGI [0w;  w].
This provides the basis for the solution concepts we will adopt throughout the paper.
Denition 1 Let (F;W;P ) be a matching market and let I be the initial matching. The
prole of strategies  is an ordinal Nash equilibrium (ON equilibrium) in the Decentralized
Game if, for each player v in V , v stochastically Pv-dominates every alternative strategy 0v
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given  v.
Thus, by using a strategy other than v, v will not be able to strictly increase the probability
of obtaining any v0 (an agent with whom it may end up matched) and all agents ranked higher
than v0 in its true preference list, Pv. This means that we will be concerned in nding a
prole of strategies  with the property that, once adopted by the agents, no one can prot by
unilaterally deviating for all possible utility representations of the agentspreferences.
Finally, the notion of ordinal Nash equilibrium can be rened to account for the dynamic
nature of the Decentralized Game.
Denition 2 Let (F;W;P ) be a matching market and let I be the initial matching. The
prole of strategies  is an ordinal subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (OSPN equilibrium)
in the Decentralized Game if it induces an ordinal Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the
Decentralized Game.
4 Equilibrium analysis
We begin this section by exploring the relationship between ordinal Nash and subgame perfect
ordinal Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1 Let jF j  2. Then, no information set is a singleton.
Lemma 1 Let jF j  2: Let x and x0 be the two last decision nodes of the play of the game ,
such that x0 precedes x. Then, x and x0 belong to two di¤erent rms and both rms choose the
action passat these nodes.
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Proof. First, notice that the game ends when every rm has sequentially chosen pass.
Given that x and x0 precede the terminal node reached with  and that jF j  2, it follows that
the action taken at these nodes must be pass.Now suppose, by contradiction, that both x
and x0 are rm fs decision nodes. Since, when  is considered, the game ends after f chooses
pass at x, every rm other than f must have chosen pass in the nodes that precede x.
Hence, every rm other than f has passed its turn in the nodes that precede x0. The rules of
the game thus imply that the game ends immediately after f chooses passat x0 and we reach
a contradiction: x is not a decision node.
Lemma 2 Let jF j  2: Let  be a play of the game and let x be a node of f reached along ,
such that the game does not end after fs choice at x along . Then, there exists a rm f 0 that
still has a chance to act in .
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let x be a node that belongs to f in  when nature draws the
sequence o. Let fs move at x correspond to the kth element of o. We will prove that there
exists a sequence o0 and a node x0 reached when nature draws o0, such that x and x0 belong to
the same information set.
First, assume that the game does not end after fs choice at x along . By Lemma 2,
there exists a rm f 0 that still has the chance to act along . Now let o0 be a sequence whose
k rst elements are the same as those in o, but that di¤ers from o in that f is inserted in
position k + 1 and all the remaining elements are identical. Consider any play of the game
where nature draws o0 and every agent chooses exactly the same actions as along  up to the
point where o0k+1 is called to play. Let x
0 be the node corresponding to fs move in position
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k of the sequence o0. It is clear that x0 belongs to the same information set as x, since every
action, except for the unobservable natures move, is the same along  and 0.
Now let x be a node of f , reached along , such that fs action at x is the last action in .
By Lemma 1, there exists a rm f 0 6= f that has had the chance to move immediately before f
moves at x, i.e., in position ok 1 of the sequence, and both have chosen pass.Now let o0 be a
sequence whose rst k 1 elements coincide with those of o, but where f 0 occupies the position
ok and f occupies the position ok+1. Consider the play of the game 0 where nature draws o0,
every agent up to the element k   1 in the sequence chooses exactly the same action as in ,
and f 0 chooses passwhen called to play at the kth position of the sequence. Let x0 be the
node reached in 0 where f acts in position k + 1. Since f cannot observe natures moves nor
f 0s action, it holds exactly the same information in both x and x0. Hence, x0 belongs to the
same information set as x.
Now consider  where nature draws o and along which some worker w may accept or reject
a proposal made by rm f . Let x be the node where w acts and let fs proposal correspond to
the kth element of o. Lemma 1 ensures that the game does not end after ws move at x. Hence,
let o0 be any sequence whose k rst elements are the same as those in o, but such that the
elements in position k+1 are di¤erent. Dene 0 as a play of the game in which nature draws
o0 and every other player chooses the same actions as along  up to the point where w reacts
to fs proposal. Let x0 be the node where w takes such decision. Since natures draws are not
observable, ws information is exactly the same in x and in x0. It follows that the information
set containing x is not a singleton.
An immediate implication of this result is that the set of ordinal Nash and subgame perfect
ordinal Nash equilibria coincide. In fact, given that all information sets are non-singletons, the
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Decentralized Game has no proper subgames. It may be conjectured that this is due to the low
information environment we have assumed. And there are labor markets in which agents may
become aware of events that do not a¤ect them directly acquaintances and social networks in
general may play an important role. However, considering an enriched information environment
where agents perceive all the o¤ers that are made, as well as the proposed workersreactions,
the arguments in the above proof remain valid, as long as natures move remains unobservable.
Roughly speaking, for every decision node x along some play of the game that includes a draw
of nature o, it is always possible to nd a decision node x0 belonging to the same information
set of x by building a di¤erent play of the game in the following way: add a single rm to o, let
it choose passin its new decision node, and let agents choose exactly the same actions as in
the original play in every other node. The conclusion follows since every proposal, acceptance,
and rejection is made respecting the original order. Hence, even in this extreme case, ordinal
subgame perfect Nash coincide with ordinal Nash equilibria. In what follows, we will refer to
these concepts indistinctly as ordinal equilibria.
The following theorem is the main result of this section. Individual rationality is an obvious
necessary condition that every ordinal equilibrium outcome must fulll. Here, we state that
under every ordinal equilibrium play of the Decentralized Game where rms use lists of pref-
erences, some form of stability is preserved. To be more precise, every matching that can be
obtained under such a play is stable for the same prole of preferences. The following remark
is used in the proof of the theorem.
Remark 1 When using a preference strategy, a rm will not re a worker it proposed to nor
exchange him for another worker along any play of the Decentralized Game. In fact, when a
proposal is made, the rm reveals that this particular worker is the best among all who have
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not rejected it. If the worker accepts, the only occasion under which the rm makes a proposal
again is when the worker it holds resigns from his position.
Theorem 1 Let I be an individually rational input matching for (F;W; (QF ; PW )). Assume
that the strategy prole  = (QF ; W ) is an ordinal equilibrium in the Decentralized Game.
Then, the probability distribution obtained over the set of matchings is such that every element
in its support is a member of S(QF ; PW ).
Proof. Suppose that f1; :::; kg is the support of the distribution induced over the set of
matchings when agents use . Assume that for some i 2 f1; :::; kg; i =2 S(QF ; W ). We will
prove that  is not an ordinal equilibrium.
Let  be a play of the game that results in i. To start, notice that for every rm f it
must be the case that its assignment, i(f), is acceptable with respect to Qf . In fact, once
using Qf , f never proposes, under any play of the game, to a worker that, according to Qf ,
is considered worse than being unmatched. On the other hand, every worker must consider
his partner acceptable with respect to P . Assume that this is not the case and that there
exists a worker, say w, such that wPwi(w). Individual rationality of the matching 
I implies
i(w) 6= I(w). Hence, w must include, at some point along , accepting i(w)s proposal.
Now take an alternative strategy ̂w according to which no o¤er is accepted by w. By using
̂w, w may end up unmatched or, if initially matched, keep his original partner I(w), but he
is never assigned to a rm considered unacceptable under Pw. Thus, the following holds:
1 = PrfgDGI [̂w;  w](w)Rwwg > PrfgDGI [](w)Rwwg
and w is not a best reply to  w.
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We have proved that i is individually rational. Thus, there must exist a blocking pair
for i when the preference prole (QF ; PW ) is considered. Let us say (f; w) blocks i, i.e.,
fPwi(w) and wQfi(f). This implies that f proposed to w and, by Remark 1, was rejected
by w in the course of . Hence, w includes rejecting f in at least one of ws information sets.
Now, dene ̂w as the strategy according to which w chooses the same actions as under w at
every information set, except for those that lead to rejecting f . When using ̂w, if f proposes
to w, w accepts this proposal and rejects every subsequent o¤er.
First, let us prove that the probability of being assigned to f is strictly higher under ̂w
than under w. Recall that  is a play of the game leading to i and let o be natures move in
. We know that rm f must have proposed to w along . If, instead of using w, w deviates
and acts according to ̂w, by Remark 1, w will end up matched to f when nature draws o and
 w is used. Now let 0 be the play of the game in which nature draws o0, with o0 6= o, and
players use (̂w;  w). If f does not propose to w along 0, w acts exactly as if using w and
ends up matched to the same partner as when nature draws o and players use . Otherwise,
f and w are matched in the nal matching. It follows that the probability of having f and w
matched is strictly increased when w uses ̂w.
In order to prove w is not a best reply to  w, assume, without loss of generality, that
Pw = f1, f2,..., fm 1, f , fm+1,..., w,..., fn. Consider a rm fj , with j = 1; :::; m   1, and
consider all the plays of the game where  is used and where w and fj end up together in the
nal matching. Some of these plays may not give fj assigned to w when he deviates and acts
according to ̂w. However, the only occasion under which this happens is when w obtains a
proposal from f and ends up matched to f . Hence, the probability of having w matched to f
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or to a rm he considers better than f is strictly increased when w uses ̂w. We have
PrfgDGI [̂w;  w](w)Rwfg > PrfgDGI [](w)Rwfg;
contradicting that  is an ordinal equilibrium.
The importance of this result lies in two of its implications. Since the set of unmatched
agents is the same for every matching that is stable in a matching market (McVitie and Wilson,
1970, and Roth, 1982), the same agents remain unmatched in every possible outcome of an
ordinal equilibrium where rms use lists of workers to guide their decisions. Moreover, when
we focus on equilibria where rms act according to their true preferences, stability with respect
to the true preferences is guaranteed. Such straightforward form of behavior can be justied.
In some settings, rms obey objective criteria when selecting whom to hire (e.g., universities
select students according to their grades, some rms choose their workers basing on scores
given by a recruiting agency, student placement mechanisms assign students to public schools
according to the area of residence,...). Even when rms are not constrained to follow such rules,
hiring new workers embodies a process of aggregating the opinions of di¤erent individuals that
compose a recruiting committee; hence, it may be that a list of workers is xed and all decisions
are myopically taken basing on that list. Having to decide what to do next at each moment
in time may be a less plausible form of behavior. Finally, reverting to the true preferences is
always an easy resort, given the multiplicity of available strategies and the complexity of the
environment.
Ordinal equilibria always exist when the initial matching is individually rational. In par-
ticular, the following results show the existence of ordinal equilibria where rms use preference
strategies.
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Denition 3 Let I be an arbitrary matching. We say that  is individually rational with
respect to I if  2 IR(P ) and if, for all f 2 F , w0 = I(f)P (f)(f), implies (w0) 6= w0.
We will denote by IR
I
(P ) the set of all individually rational matchings with respect to I .
For illustration, in the particular case that I is the empty matching, the set of all individually
rational matchings with respect to this initial matching coincides with the set of individually
rational matchings (i.e., IR?(P ) = IR(P )).10




Proof. Consider  2 S(P ). We will prove that  2 IRI (P ) using a contradiction
argument. Assume that  2 S(P ): By denition of stability, this implies  2 IR(P ), but
assume that there exists a rm f such that w0 = I(f)Pf(f) and (w0) = w0. Stability of
 implies that w0Pw0f and we get a contradiction: I is not individually rational. Therefore,
every stable matching is an element of IR
I
(P ).
Since a stable matching exists for every marriage market (Gale and Shapley, 1962), IR
I
(P )
is not empty for every individually rational matching I .
Proposition 3 Let I be an individually rational matching for (F;W;P ) and let  2 IRI (P ).
Then, there exists an ordinal equilibrium  = (QF ; W ) in the Decentralized Game that leads
to  with probability one.
Proof. Dene Qf = (f), for every rm f and let w = Qw = (w). It is clear that every
play of the game with the prole  will lead to the output matching .
10This holds since if fP (f)(f), then (f) 6= f .
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Let us show that for every rm f , Qf is a best reply to Q f . First, as long as (f) 6= I(f),
f never holds its initial match under . Indeed, it is clear that if I(f)Pf(f), then I(f)
receives and accepts another rms proposal (and in the case that (f)PfI(f), I(f) is not a
temptation). Hence, when (f) 2W , given that the only worker willing to accept fs proposal
is (f), the only choice f can actually make is between being assigned to this worker or staying
alone. From individual rationality we have (f)Pff which implies that f will not be able to
prot from deviating from Qf . Obviously, for f such that (f) = f , no worker accepts fs
proposal and it can do no better than staying alone.
Finally, for any w, w is a best reply to  w. In fact, given rmsstrategies, w gets at
most one proposal and, considering  is individually rational, the best he can do is to accept
it. This completes the proof.
One particular case worth exploring is the case in which the starting point is the empty
matching. The Decentralized Game then becomes a stylized model of an entry-level labor
market without commitment, where cohorts of vacant positions and cohorts of candidates
become simultaneously available, and decisions are taken in a decentralized way. It turns out
that starting from the empty matching allows us to take the analysis farther.
Proposition 4 Let I be the empty matching and let  2 S(P ). Then, there exists an ordinal
equilibrium in the Decentralized Game where rms reveal their true preferences that yields 
with probability one.
Proof. Let  = (PF ; W ) and dene w as follows. For every worker w matched under ,
w is the strategy of accepting only (w) and rejecting every other proposal, while it leads to
the rejection of all proposals, without exception, when w is unmatched under .
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We start by showing that the prole of strategies  always leads to the matching , i.e.,
PrfgDGI [] = g = 1. If this is not the case, then there exists a play of the game leading to
b 6= . But this is equivalent to having a rm, say f , that ends up matched to a partner, b(f),
di¤erent from (f) for some instance of the game. Given that f is unmatched in the initial
matching and that the only worker willing to accept f is (f), we must have b(f) = f (as long
as f 6= (f); otherwise it must be the case that b(f) = (f) and we have a contradiction).
So assume that b(f) = f . Since (f) would accept fs proposal and f is acting according to
its true preferences, it must be the case that fPf(f). Hence, (f) is not acceptable and the
stability of  is contradicted.
Let us now prove that, for every rm f , Pf stochastically Pf -dominates every other strategy
f . We will start by considering the case in which (f) 6= f . Given that the only worker who is
willing to accept f is (f), by choosing its strategy appropriately, f can either be alone or hold
(f) under the output matching. By stability of , (f)Pff ; since truth telling guarantees
that (f) is assigned to f with probability one, f cannot improve by switching its strategy.
In the case that (f) = f , no worker accepts its proposal, and the best it can achieve is
staying unmatched. It follows that f cannot do better than being assigned to (f) and Pf
stochastically Pf -dominates every other strategy f .
Now take the case of an arbitrary worker, w. Suppose, by contradiction, that w does not
stochastically Pw-dominate strategy ̂w. This implies that PrfgDGI [PF ; ̂w;  w](w)Rw(w)g =
1 and that there exists a rm, say f , such that the following holds: PrfgDGI [PF ; ̂w;  w](w) =
fg > 0 and fPw(w). But this means that, for some draw of nature, f approaches w before
making an o¤er to (f). In fact, it cannot be the case that f proposes to (f) rst and he does
not accept it, as (f) is acting according to his original strategy, (f), dened above. Thus, f
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must prefer w to (f). However, in this case (f; w) forms a blocking pair for , contradicting
the fact that  is stable.
Hence, in a decentralized entry-level labor market every stable matching can be reached as
the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the game where rms stick to their true rankings.
The (partially) converse statement is given by Theorem 1, ensuring that every such ordinal
equilibrium guarantees stability. These results may be viewed as an extension of some known
features of the game induced by Gale and Shapleys centralized mechanism (Roth, 1984b),
where the underlying strategy space is conned to the set of preference strategies.
5 Discussion
In this section we put our results in perspective and discuss some of the underlying assumptions.
As mentioned in the Introduction, centralized procedures have been introduced in many
matching markets in response to certain market failures. It has been argued that the stability
of the mechanisms employed is crucial for their success. In fact, those centralized procedures
that achieved stable outcomes resolved the market failures, while those producing unstable
outcomes continued to fail.11 Since many matching markets do not employ centralized match-
ing procedures, and yet are not observed to experience such problems, we can suspect that
some markets may reach stable outcomes by means of decentralized decision making without
commitment. Theorem 1 provides support to this conjecture. To make things clear, let us
return to Example 1. We have seen that some plays of the game lead to unstable outcomes
for the true preferences (the matching ̂ is not stable). Nevertheless, Theorem 1 implies that
11See, for example, Roth (1984a, 1990, 1991).
26
if we expect agents to use equilibrium strategies and, by best-replying, rms faithfully reveal
their true preferences, then a stable matching is reached. Hence, if equilibrium predictions are
to be taken seriously, the success of some decentralized markets is explained.
It is now probably worth discussing the robustness of the results to some changes in the
rules of the game. First, as already mentioned, the simplifying assumption that rms do not
repeat o¤ers ensures that the game is nite. Still, admitting that rms are persistent does not
compromise the above results, as long as we allow for a nite number of repetitions.
Second, throughout the game matchings are formed and dissolved as agents act in what
they perceive to be their own best interest. We may think of this as a mere negotiation
process, where no contracts are signed and where these temporary matchings would be the
ones prevailing should negotiations suddenly stop. Alternatively, considering that provisional
matchings are indeed consummated amounts to assuming that agents are free to recontract
without any restrictions whatsoever. In the other extreme, we can consider that it is too
costly to re a worker. Hence, only rms with vacancies will actually make proposals and the
Decentralized Game falls in the realms of Blum, Roth, and Rothblums analysis. Blum, Roth,
and Rothblum (1997) study how markets for senior positions may be re-stabilized after new
rms have been created or workers have retired. In fact, stability for the true preferences is
achieved in every equilibrium where rms act according to their true preferences, as long as
the starting point is a rm-quasi-stable matching, i.e., a matching whose stability has been
disrupted by the creation of a new position or the retirement of a worker. Hence, Theorem
1, which allows for having any individually rational as an initial matching, no longer holds.
The validity of Proposition 3 is also compromised: if we start form an initial matching where
every rm is matched, no rm will be allowed to hire a new worker and the initial matching
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situation will be preserved, independently of the strategies used. In this setting, the majority
of the results on equilibria depend on having a rm-quasi-stable matching as a starting point.
A di¤erent issue concerns providing workers with the initiative to quit and to propose. In
some real labor markets, not only rms, but also workers may defy their preferred rms and
we may account for this in the Decentralized Game. Hence, suppose that at each moment
in time, an agent, either a rm or a worker, is randomly selected and makes an o¤er to
someone in the other side of the market to whom it has never proposed to nor received a
proposal from. The agent that receives the o¤er can only accept, or reject and keep his former
partner, if a former partner existed. The game ends when every agent in the market passes
its turn. It turns out that, starting from an arbitrary matching, every individually rational
matching can be obtained in an ordinal equilibrium play of the game, so that the scope of
Proposition 3 is enhanced. In what Theorem 1 and its implications are concerned, stability is
robust to sophisticated behavior by one side of the market, provided that the other side acts
in accordance with the true preferences. To be precise, every matching sustained at an ordinal
equilibrium is stable with respect to the true preferences whenever rms (respectively workers)
faithfully transmit their preferences and workers (respectively rms) behave strategically by
using strategies that may reveal di¤erent orderings of the other side of the market in di¤erent
executions of the algorithm. Finally, in the particular case that the initial matching is the
empty matching, every stable matching can be reached with probability one in an equilibrium
where one side of the market truthfully reveals its preferences.12
12A formal statement of these results and their proofs are given in the Appendix, in Propositions 5, 6, and 7.
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6 Concluding Remarks
The present paper attempts to extend the two-sided matching theory by constructing a game
that mimics the behavior of some decentralized labor markets. Equilibrium analysis in a
random context is performed at the expense of using an ordinal equilibrium concept that
allows for obtaining some interesting results. Namely, equilibria where rms use preference
strategies always exist and lead to matchings that preserve stability for a particular prole of
preferences. Furthermore, when we consider an ordinal equilibrium where rms act truthfully,
stability for the true preferences is achieved in every outcome matching. This fact may account
for the success of some decentralized labor markets. A case of particular interest has the empty
matching as the starting point of the game. Here we give a fairly complete characterization of
ordinal equilibria.
It is natural to ask to what extent the stylized model constructed here can serve as a
description of a real decentralized labor market. The marriage model is perhaps too simple.
Aside from the assumption that each rm has a unique position to ll, the important unrealistic
feature lies in considering that the salary associated with each position is a xed part of the
job description, rather than something to be negotiated between each rm and prospective
worker. Furthermore, the concept of ordinal equilibrium justied by the ordinal nature of
agentspreferences is quite demanding. It thus remains important to explore models where
these assumptions are relaxed and a milder solution concept is used, even though we believe




In this section we extend some of the above results to the case in which both sides of the market
are able to tender o¤ers. First, it can easily be shown that no information set is a singleton,
as long as there are at least two agents in the market, i.e., jV j  2.13 It follows that subgame
perfect ordinal Nash equilibria coincide with ordinal Nash equilibria. The remaining results
are proved in what follows.
Proposition 5 Let I be an arbitrary matching in (F;W;P ) and let  2 IR(P ). Then, there
exists an ordinal equilibrium in the Decentralized Game that leads to  with probability one.
Proof. Let Qv = (v), for all v 2 V . Clearly, every play of the game with strategy prole
Q leads to . We will show that Q is an ordinal equilibrium. In the case that v is such that
(v) 6= v, the only agent that proposes to or accepts a proposal from v is (v). Hence, no
deviation will improve vs match. Otherwise, for v such that (v) = v, no agent is willing to
match v. As before, by switching strategy, v cannot end up matched and improve his position.
In what follows, we extend Theorem 1. The result is stated for equilibria in which rms use
preference strategies and workers are allowed to have other forms of behavior. Note however
that we restrict to equilibria where a workers strategy is consistent with a list of preferences
along each play of the game (even though it may correspond to incompatible lists when di¤erent
plays of the game are considered). A similar result, where the roles of rms and workers are
13The reasoning behind the proof of Proposition 1 remains valid, but instead of analysing decision nodes that
belong to rms and to workers as separate cases, the distinction to be made is between nodes where proposals
are issued, and those where acceptances or rejections take place.
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interchanged, can be proved.
Proposition 6 Let I be an arbitrary matching in (F;W;P ). Assume that the strategy prole
 = (QF ; W ) is an ordinal equilibrium in the Decentralized Game, where w is consistent with
a list of preferences in each play of the game, for all w 2W . Then, the probability distribution
obtained over the set of matchings is such that every element in its support is a member of
S(QF ; PW ).
Proof. Suppose that f1; :::; kg is the support of the distribution induced over the set of
matchings when agents use  and assume that for some i 2 f1; :::; kg; i =2 S(QF ; W ). We
will prove that  is not an ordinal equilibrium.
We will denote by  a play of the game leading to i. To start, notice that for every rm
f it must be the case that its assignment, i(f), is acceptable with respect to Qf . In fact,
once using Qf , f never proposes to nor accepts a proposal from a worker that, according to
Qf , is considered worse than being unmatched. On the other hand, every worker must nd
his partner acceptable. Assume that this is not the case and that there exists a worker, say w,
such that wPwi(w). Now take an alternative strategy ̂w according to which w resigns from
I(w) if w is initially matched and accepts no o¤ers. By using ̂w, w ends up unmatched in
every play of the game. Hence, 1 = PrfgDGI [̂w;  w](w)Rwwg > PrfgDGI [](w)Rwwg and
w is not a best reply to  w.
Individual rationality of i of (QF ; PW ) is proven. Thus, there must exist a blocking pair
for i when the preference prole (QF ; PW ) is considered. Let us say (f; w) blocks i, i.e.,
fPwi(w) and wQfi(f). This implies that, in the course of , either (i) f proposed to w or
(ii) w proposed to f . If (i) holds, by Remark 1, f was rejected by w and we can prove that w
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is not a best-reply to  w using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1. Otherwise,
in case (ii), since w uses a strategy that is consistent with a list of preferences under , f must
have rejected w. (The reasoning behind this relies in arguments similar to those of Remark 1.)
In this case we can nd a successful deviation for f . In fact, dene ̂f as the strategy according
to which f chooses the same actions as under f at every information set, except for those that
lead to rejecting w when w proposes. Hence, when using ̂f , if w proposes to f along a play
of the game, f accepts this proposal and holds it until the end of this play. For every play of
the game in which w does not propose to f , f acts exactly as when using f .
First, we will prove that the probability of being assigned to w is strictly higher under ̂f
than under f . Recall that  is a play of the game leading to i and let o be natures move
in . We know that w must have proposed to f along . Once f deviates and acts according
to ̂f , f will end up matched to w when nature draws o and  f is used. Now let 0 be the
play of the game in which nature draws o0, with o0 6= o, and players use (̂f ;  f ). If w does
not propose to f along 0, f ends up matched to the same partner as when nature draws o
and players use . Otherwise, f and w are matched in the nal matching. It follows that the
probability of having f and w matched is strictly increased when f uses ̂f .
In order to complete the proof that f is not a best reply to  f , assume, without loss of
generality, that Pf = w1, w2,..., wl 1, w, wl+1,..., f . Consider a worker wj , with j = 1; :::; l 1,
and consider all the plays of the game where  is used and where f and wj end up together in
the nal matching. Such plays may not give wj assigned to f when f switches to ̂f . However,
the only occasion under which this happens is when f obtains a proposal from w and ends up
matched to him. Hence, the probability of having f matched to w or to a worker it considers
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better than w is strictly increased when f uses ̂f . We have
PrfgDGI [̂f ;  f ](f)Rfwg > PrfgDGI [](f)Rfwg;
contradicting that  is an ordinal equilibrium.
Proposition 7 Let I be the empty matching and let  2 S(P ). Then, there exists an ordinal
equilibrium in the Decentralized Game where one side of the market reveals its true preferences
that yields  with probability one.
Proof. We analyze the case in which rms act according to their true preferences; the
same arguments hold, with the roles of rms and workers reversed, when workers act straight-
forwardly. Hence, consider  = (PF ; W ) and dene w as follows: if w is matched under ,
w is the strategy of always choosing passwhen called to propose and accepting only (w)s
proposal; while if w is such that (w) = w, no proposal is made nor accepted by w.
We start by showing that the prole of strategies  always leads to the matching . If this
is not the case, then there exists a play of the game leading to b 6= . But this is equivalent
to having a rm, say f , that ends up matched to a partner, b(f), di¤erent from (f) for some
instance of the game. Given that workers make no proposals and that the only one willing to
accept f is (f), we must have b(f) = f (as long as f 6= (f); otherwise it must be the case
that b(f) = (f) and we have a contradiction). So assume that b(f) = f . Since (f) would
accept fs proposal and f is acting according to its true preferences, it must be the case that
fPf(f). Hence, (f) is not acceptable and the stability of  is contradicted.
Let us now prove that, for every rm f , Pf stochastically Pf -dominates every other strategy
f . We will start by considering the case in which (f) 6= f . Given that workers do not issue
o¤ers and that the only worker who is willing to accept f is (f), by choosing its strategy
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appropriately, f can either be alone or hold (f) under the output matching. By stability of
, (f)Pff ; since truth telling guarantees that (f) is assigned to f with probability one, f
cannot improve by deviating. In the case that (f) = f , no worker accepts its proposal nor
proposes to f , and the best it can achieve is staying unmatched. It follows that f cannot do
better than being assigned to (f) and Pf stochastically Pf -dominates every other strategy
f .
Now take the case of an arbitrary worker, w. Suppose, by contradiction, that w does not
stochastically Pw-dominate a di¤erent strategy ̂w. Then, PrfgDGI [PF ; ̂w;  w](w)Rw(w)g =
1 and that there exists a rm, say f , such that the following holds: PrfgDGI [PF ; ̂w;  w](w) =
fg > 0 and fPw(w). Let  be a play of the game where f and w are matched. By stability
of , (f)Pfw, so that f proposes to (f) in the course of . Given the outcome matching,
(f) rejects fs proposal. This contradicts the denition of (f)s strategy.
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